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EXHAUSTED YET? THE FIRST-SALE 
DOCTRINE AND THE SECOND-HAND 
MARKET FOR SOFTWARE LICENSES IN 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 
MAY KHOURY* 
Abstract: In UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corporation, the Court of 
Justice of the European Union held that owners of software copyright could not 
prohibit the resale of used perpetual licenses allowing the use of such programs. 
The decision promises to significantly affect the software market and other digi-
tal industries. It also illustrates an instance where the CJEU forces a decision us-
ing well-established principles rather than adapting to an ever-changing techno-
logical landscape. While the CJEU’s ruling came as a surprise to many in how 
far it was willing to go in applying the principle of exhaustion to intangible ma-
terials, its attempt fell short from elucidating a clear rule on the rights of second-
hand buyers. 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 3, 2012, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is-
sued a landmark ruling on the legal protection of computer programs in 
UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corporation.1 The court held that 
owners of software copyright could not prohibit the resale of used perpetual 
licenses allowing the use of such programs.2 Instead, the holder of a perpetual 
user license will be able to sell that license to buyers, who will then become 
lawful acquirers of the program and benefit from the rights of reproduction.3 
Buyers of a perpetual license will be able to download the corresponding pro-
gram from the software developer’s website without committing copyright 
                                                                                                                           
 * May Khoury is a Note Editor for Volume 38 of the Boston College International & Com-
parative Law Review. 
 1 See generally Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp., 2012 E.C.R. I-0000, 
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=124564&doclang=en; Fiona 
Maclean, European Union (CJEU) Has Delivered Its Long-awaited Decision in UsedSoft v Oracle 
International Corp., 19 COMPUTER & TELECOMM. L. REV. 1, 1 (2013). 
 2 See UsedSoft, 2012 E.C.R. I-0000 ¶ 89; Press Release, Court of Justice of the European 
Union, An Author of Software Cannot Oppose the Resale of His “Used” Licenses Allowing the 
Use of His Programs Downloaded from the Internet (July 3, 2012), available at http://curia.
europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2012-07/cp120094en.pdf [hereinafter July 3 Press 
Release]. 
 3 UsedSoft, 2012 E.C.R. I-00000 ¶ 89. 
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infringement, even if the license is expressly non-transferable.4 The decision 
promises to significantly affect the software market and other digital indus-
tries.5 It also illustrates an instance where the CJEU forces a decision using 
well-established principles rather than adapting to an ever-changing techno-
logical landscape.6 
This Comment examines the case and the holding in three parts. Part I 
provides the factual and procedural background of the court’s decision in 
UsedSoft. Part II reviews the court’s analysis and conclusions in the frame-
work of the copyright regime in the European Union and against the back-
ground of the UsedSoft and Oracle dispute. Part III analyzes the implications 
of the court’s decision on the software market, discusses the foreseeable ways 
in which software developers will use currently available technology to effec-
tively regain control of the resale rights denied to them by this decision, and 
finally, analyzes the implications of the court’s decision to software develop-
ers operating outside of the European Union. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Exhaustion Principle in the European Union 
The European Union has actively been pursuing copyright harmoniza-
tion in its member states since the early 1990s.7 Through a series of harmo-
nizing directives implemented by member states and interpretative rulings by 
the CJEU, the institutions of the European Union have produced their own 
body of copyright norms.8 These directives offer further protection in addi-
tion to that of several international instruments to which all member states in 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See id. ¶¶ 72, 89; July 3 Press Release, supra note 2. 
 5 See Maclean, supra note 1, at 2; David Naylor & Emily Parris, After ReDigi: Contrasting 
the EU and US Approaches to the Re-sale of Second-hand Digital Assets, 35 EUR. INTELL. PROP. 
REV. 487, 488 (2013); Alice J. Won, Exhausted? Video Game Companies and the Battle Against 
Allowing the Resale of Software Licenses, 33 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 386, 396 
(2013); see also Simon Stokes, Some Current Legal Issues in Publishing, 24 ENT. L. REV. 241, 
242 (2013) (questioning the effect of UsedSoft on the publishing industry given the limited, revo-
cable and non-perpetual character of e-book licenses). 
 6 See Bill Batchelor & Daniel Keohane, UsedSoft—Where to Now for Software Vendors? 33 
EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 545, 545 (2012). 
 7 PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT 64 (2d ed. 2010). 
As of July 1, 2013, twenty-eight states were members of the European Union: Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Id. 
 8 Id.; see Council Directive 2009/24, 2009 O.J. (L 111) 16 (EC); Council Directive 2006/116, 
2006 O.J. (L 372) 12 (EC); Council Directive 2006/115, 2006 O.J. (L 376) 28 (EC); Council Di-
rective 2004/48, 2004 O.J. (L157) 45 (EC) (as amended); Council Directive 2001/84, 2001 O.J. (L 
272) 32 (EC); Council Directive 96/9, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20 (EC); Council Directive 93/83, 1993 
O.J. (L 248) 15 (EEC); Council Directive 87/54, 1987 O.J. (L 24) 36 (EEC). 
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the European Union have adhered, including the Berne Convention, the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty, and the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS 
Agreement).9 
One issue that the European Union directives aim to address is the right 
of a person who bought a copyrighted work to resell that copy.10 According to 
the principle of exhaustion, also known as the first-sale doctrine in the United 
States, the first sale of a copy of a work deprives the copyright holder from 
the right to control the further distribution of that same copy.11 
Two directives indicate that the principle of exhaustion applies to com-
puter programs.12 The first is the more general 2001 Directive on the Harmo-
nisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Infor-
mation Society (InfoSoc Directive).13 The second is the more specific 2009 
Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs (Software Di-
rective).14 Article 4(2) of the Software Directive provides that the “first sale 
in the Community of a copy of a program by a rightholder or with his consent 
shall exhaust the distribution right within the Community of that copy, with 
the exception of the right to control further rental of the program or a copy 
thereof.”15 
Software companies have taken several measures in order to avoid being 
bound by the exhaustion principle, and thus to retain the right to control the 
second-hand market of their programs.16 One such way is through software 
licensing agreements, which grant the licensee the right to use the software 
under certain terms and conditions.17 Generally, software vendors prefer li-
censes rather than sales because they allow the licensor to retain control over 
future uses of the copyrighted materials.18 Until UsedSoft, it was unclear in 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 7, at 68. 
 10 See Council Directive 2009/24, supra note 8, art. 4(2); Council Directive 2001/29, supra 
note 8, art. 4(2). 
 11 Eric Tjong Tjin Tai, Exhaustion and Online Delivery of Digital Works, 25 EUR. INTELL. 
PROP. REV. 207, 207, 209 (2003). 
 12 See Friedrich Ruffler, Is Trading in Used Software an Infringement of Copyright? The 
Perspective of European Law, 33 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 375, 377 (2011) (pointing to the 
Software Directive and InfoSoc Directive as starting points to the question of distributing used 
software). 
 13 See id.; Council Directive 2001/29, supra note 8, art. 4(2). 
 14 See Council Directive 2009/24, supra note 8, art. 4(2); Ruffler, supra note 12, at 377. 
 15 Council Directive 2009/24, supra note 8, art. 4(2). 
 16 See Louise Longdin & Pheh Hoon Lim, Inexhaustible Distribution Rights for Copyright 
Owners and the Foreclosure of Secondary Markets for Used Software, 44 INT’L REV. INTELL. 
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 541, 545 (2013); Lisa R. Pitell, Non Transferability of Software Licens-
es in the European Union, 26 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 390, 392 (2004). 
 17 See Longdin & Lim, supra note 16, at 545; see also KATHERYN A. ANDRESEN, LAW AND 
BUSINESS OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE 555 (2012). 
 18 See Longdin & Lim, supra note 16, at 544–45. 
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the European Union whether the exhaustion principle applied to licensees, 
who acquire not ownership of the software but rather only the right to use it 
by downloading it.19 
B. The Oracle and UsedSoft Dispute 
The dispute between Oracle and UsedSoft originates out of the second-
hand market for used licenses.20 It brought the question of whether the ex-
haustion principle applies to software licenses—in other words, whether the 
first grant of a license exhausts license rights—before the Grand Chamber of 
the CJEU.21 
Oracle creates and sells computer software.22 Its website makes availa-
ble for download some of its programs.23 A license agreement granting the 
user rights includes the right to store a copy of the downloaded program per-
manently on a main server.24 Oracle allows a certain number of users to ac-
cess the copy on the server and download it to the main memory of their 
computers. 25  Users may choose to purchase group licenses, which allow 
twenty-five users to download the program from the main server.26 Oracle’s 
license agreement states that the right to use the program is for an unlimited 
period, non-exclusive and non-transferable.27 
UsedSoft is in the second-hand market for software licenses.28 It ac-
quires and sells user licenses from customers who no longer have use for the 
license they purchased from software companies such as Oracle.29 Customers 
buy a used license from UsedSoft and download a copy of the software di-
rectly from Oracle’s website.30 Those who already have a copy of the soft-
ware but only want to buy further licenses for additional users buy the license 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp., 2012 E.C.R. I-00000 ¶ 34; Won, 
supra note 5, at 392. 
 20 See UsedSoft, 2012 E.C.R. I-00000 ¶ 24; Christopher Stothers, When Is Copyright Ex-
hausted by a Software License? UsedSoft v. Oracle, 34 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 787, 788 (2012). 
 21 See UsedSoft, 2012 E.C.R. I-00000 ¶ 34; Won, supra note 5, at 392. The allocation of the 
case to the Grand Chamber demonstrates that the German court regarded the question as particu-
larly complex or important. Stothers, supra note 20, at 788. 
 22 UsedSoft, 2012 E.C.R. I-00000 ¶ 20. 
 23 Id. ¶ 21. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. ¶ 22. 
 26 Id. ¶¶ 21–22. 
 27 Id. ¶ 23. 
 28 See id. ¶ 24. 
 29 See Yin Harn Lee, UsedSoft GmbH v Oracle International Corp. (Case C-128/11)—Sales 
of “Used” Software and the Principle of Exhaustion, 43 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETI-
TION L. 846, 848 (2012). 
 30 UsedSoft, 2012 E.C.R. I-00000 ¶ 26. 
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from UsedSoft, who then induces them to copy the software to the computers 
of the additional users.31 
Oracle filed suit against UsedSoft in the German regional court in Mu-
nich, asking that it cease its resale practice, and the court granted an injunc-
tion.32 UsedSoft appealed to the Bundesgerichtshof (the federal court) on a 
point of law.33 
The Bundesgerichtshof did not issue its ruling immediately.34 It agreed 
that UsedSoft was infringing on Oracle’s exclusive right of reproduction of 
computer programs, which is guaranteed by Article 4(1)(a) of the Software 
Directive.35 It also considered, however, Article 5 of that same directive, also 
transposed into the German Law on Copyright and Related Rights, which 
provides that, absent contractual provisions, reproduction or alteration of the 
software “shall not require authorisation by the rightholder where [it] is nec-
essary for the use of the computer program by the lawful acquirer in accord-
ance with its intended purpose.”36 What mattered to the Bundesgerichtshof, 
then, was whether UsedSoft customers were lawful acquirers of the software 
who could distribute and reproduce the program according to the terms of the 
Software Directive.37 
The Bundesgerichtshof referred the case to the CJEU, asking for a pre-
liminary ruling on three questions.38 It asked whether the first licensee was a 
“lawful acquirer,” whether the exhaustion principle applied when the first 
licensee downloaded the program, and whether a person who bought a used 
license can rely on exhaustion to distribute the copy of the program if the first 
licensee is no longer using it. 39 In the UsedSoft scenario, these questions 
would be as follows: was the customer who bought a computer program from 
Oracle a “lawful acquirer,” did the exhaustion principle apply when Oracle’s 
customer downloaded the program, and can UsedSoft rely on that exhaustion 
to distribute the copy of the program if Oracle’s original customer was no 
longer using it.40 
                                                                                                                           
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. ¶ 27. Germany has transposed the Software Directive into national law. Gesetz über 
Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Law on Copyright and Related Rights], Sept. 9, 1965, 
BGBl. I at 2586, arts. 69c–d (Ger.), as amended, available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/
englisch_urhg/act_on_copyright_and_related_rights_(copyright_act).pdf [hereinafter German Law 
on Copyright]. 
 33 UsedSoft, 2012 E.C.R. I-00000 ¶ 7. 
 34 Id. ¶ 34; Lee, supra note 29, at 848–49. 
 35 UsedSoft, 2012 E.C.R. I-00000 ¶ 28. 
 36 Id. ¶¶ 29–30; Council Directive 2009/24, supra note 8, art. 4(2); German Law on Copy-
right, supra note 32, at arts. 69c–d. 
 37 See UsedSoft, 2012 E.C.R. I-00000 ¶ 34. 
 38 Id.; see Lee, supra note 29, at 848–49. 
 39 See UsedSoft, 2012 E.C.R. I-00000 ¶¶ 33–34; Lee, supra note 29, at 848–49. 
 40 See UsedSoft, 2012 E.C.R. I-00000 ¶¶ 33–34; Maclean, supra note 5, at 1. 
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The CJEU’s decision took many by surprise.41 The court held that the 
exhaustion principle did apply to software licenses, even when customers 
make subsequent copies by download rather than through tangible mediums.42 
Once the licensor has licensed the software to a user, the software company’s 
right to prevent further sale of that particular license is exhausted.43 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. The Concept of Lawful Acquirer 
The first question the Bundesgerichtshof presented was whether the per-
son who can rely on exhaustion of the right to distribute a copy of a computer 
program is a “lawful acquirer” within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the 
Software Directive.44 In other words, the question referred to whether the per-
son who buys a used copy of a computer program is a lawful acquirer of that 
copy.45 This would entail a right to distribute and reproduce the computer 
program insofar as it is necessary to enable the new acquirer to use the pro-
gram in accordance with its intended purpose.46 
Three articles of the Software Directive are relevant here.47 Article 4(1) 
grants an exclusive right of reproduction to the copyright owner.48 Article 
4(2) exhausts the copyright owner’s distribution right after the first sale.49 
Article 5(1) accords lawful acquirers the right to reproduce computer pro-
grams in accordance with their intended purpose.50 In short, absent specific 
                                                                                                                           
 41 See Maclean, supra note 5, at 2; Stothers, supra note 20, at 790; see also Opinion of Advo-
cate General, Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp., 2012 E.C.R. I-0000 ¶ 100, 
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=121981&pageIndex
=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=33744 [hereinafter Opinion of Advo-
cate General]. Although the Advocate General’s Opinion serves an advisory purpose and is not 
binding on the Court of Justice of the European Union, it is influential and very often followed. 
See id. 
 42 See UsedSoft, 2012 E.C.R. I-00000 ¶ 89. 
 43 See id. 
 44 See Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp., 2012 E.C.R. I-00000 ¶ 34. 
 45 See id. 
 46 See id. ¶ 18. 
 47 See infra notes 48–52 and accompanying text. 
 48 See Council Directive 2009/24, supra note 8, art. 4(1). Article 4(1) of the Software Di-
rective vests exclusive rights to the copyright owner, which include reproducing, loading, display-
ing, running, transmitting or storing, translating, adapting, arranging and otherwise altering, and 
distributing to the public. See id. 
 49 See id. art. 4(2). Article 4(2) states that “The first sale in the Community of a copy of a 
program by the rightholder or with his consent shall exhaust the distribution right within the 
Community of that copy, with the exception of the right to control further rental of the program or 
a copy thereof.” Id. 
 50 See id. art 5(1). According to Article 5(1), “In the absence of specific contractual provi-
sions, the acts referred to in points (a) and (b) of Article 4(1) shall not require authorisation by the 
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contractual provisions, it relieves the purchaser of a copy from having to ob-
tain the copyright owner’s consent to permanently or temporarily reproduce 
the computer program if it is necessary to do so for the copy to achieve its 
intended purpose.51 Read together, Articles 4(2) and 5(1) prevent the copy-
right holder from exerting a “monopoly of exploitation” over the computer 
program.52 
Oracle argued that the term “lawful acquirer” is limited to persons who 
acquire the right to use the computer program under a contract with the copy-
right owner, and that the rights the lawful acquirer receives are those stipulat-
ed in the licensing agreement.53 France, Ireland, Italy, and Advocate General 
Yves Bot in his opinion to the court all supported Oracle’s definition of a law-
ful acquirer.54 But the CJEU disagreed.55 
The CJEU declined to interpret the Software Directive in a way that 
would allow the copyright owner to prevent the effective use of used copies 
where the copies exhaust the distribution right under Article 4(2) by relying 
on his exclusive right of reproduction in Article 4(1).56 Such an interpretation 
would render ineffective the exhaustion of distribution rights in Article 4(2), 
as the principle of exhaustion would be divested of its substance if the copy-
right owner could not control further distribution of copies but could control 
reproduction.57 
B. Downloading Computer Programs: What Implications on the  
Exhaustion Principle? 
The second question before the CJEU was whether an acquirer making a 
copy with the copyright owner’s consent by downloading the program from 
the Internet onto a data carrier exhausts the right to distribute a copy of a 
computer program.58 In other words, the question was whether the exhaustion 
principle in Article 4(2) of the Software Directive applies to used licenses for 
computer programs that one downloads from the Internet.59 Both the CJEU 
and Advocate General Bot considered this question to be the most important 
                                                                                                                           
rightholder where they are necessary for the use of the computer program by the lawful acquirer in 
accordance with its intended purpose, including for error correction.” Id. 
 51 See id.; Simon Chalton, Implementation of the Software Directive in the United Kingdom: 
the Effects of the Copyright (Computer Programs) Regulations 1992, 15 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 
138, 140 (1993). 
 52 See Won, supra note 5, at 392; July 3 Press Release, supra note 2. 
 53 See Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 41, ¶ 88. 
 54 See id. ¶¶ 92, 98. 
 55 See UsedSoft, 2012 E.C.R. I-00000 ¶ 80. 
 56 See id. ¶ 82; Lee, supra note 29, at 851; Stothers, supra note 20, at 789. 
 57 See UsedSoft, 2012 E.C.R. I-00000 ¶ 83; Lee, supra note 29, at 851. 
 58 See UsedSoft, 2012 E.C.R. I-00000 ¶ 34. 
 59 See id. 
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one raised in UsedSoft.60 For the CJEU, the answer to the question depended 
in part on two critical distinctions: whether the transaction took place through 
a tangible medium, and whether the transaction resembled a sale more than a 
license.61 
1. The Tangible/Intangible Distinction 
The first distinction is the method through which the computer program 
passed from the copyright holder, Oracle, to the first acquirer and subsequent-
ly to the second acquirer.62 Oracle argued that Article 4(2), which exhausts 
the copyright owner’s control over distribution of a copy of a computer pro-
gram in the European Union following a first sale in the European Union, did 
not apply to used licenses for computer programs downloaded from the Inter-
net.63 To support its claim, Oracle pointed to the fact that it did not sell hard 
copies of its programs, arguing that it instead made the copies available for 
free, charging only a fee for the license that Oracle required in order to use 
that downloaded copy.64 The European Commission, France, Ireland, Italy, 
and Spain supported Oracle’s overall position.65 UsedSoft, however, defended 
its practices, claiming that the first download of the program from Oracle’s 
website exhausted Oracle’s right to control distribution.66 
The CJEU held that the Software Directive meant that the exhaustion of 
distribution rights applied not only to where the copyright holder made tangi-
ble copies of the software available for sale, but also when it distributed intan-
gible copies to be downloaded from its website.67 Article 1(2) explicitly states 
that the protection of the Software Directive “shall apply to the expression in 
any form of a computer program.”68 Therefore, it was clear to the CJEU that 
the intent of the European Parliament and European Council was to afford 
copies of computer programs the same protections regardless of whether a 
holder made them available for sale in tangible or intangible forms.69 
The court examined the definition and implications of its understanding 
of the term “sale” to support its lack of distinction between tangible and in-
                                                                                                                           
 60 See id. ¶ 35; Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 41, ¶ 7. 
 61 See UsedSoft, 2012 E.C.R. I-00000 ¶¶ 38–48, 53. 
 62 Id. ¶¶ 53–63. 
 63 See Council Directive 2009/24, supra note 8, art. 4(2); see also UsedSoft, 2012 E.C.R. I-
00000 ¶¶ 42–43. 
 64 See UsedSoft, 2012 E.C.R. I-00000 ¶ 43. 
 65 See Stothers, supra note 20, at 788. 
 66 See Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 41, ¶ 30. 
 67 See UsedSoft, 2012 E.C.R. I-00000 ¶¶ 59, 89; Reto M. Hilty & Kaya Koklu, Software 
Agreements: Stocktaking and Outlook—Lessons from the UsedSoft v Oracle Case from a Com-
parative Law Perspective, 44 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 263, 273 (2013). 
 68 Council Directive 2009/24, supra note 8, art. 1(2). 
 69 See UsedSoft, 2012 E.C.R. I-00000 ¶ 58. 
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tangible copies of computer programs.70 It stated that the term was commonly 
understood to refer to “an agreement by which a person, in return for pay-
ment, transfers to another person his rights of ownership in an item of tangi-
ble or intangible property belonging to him.”71 Therefore, a narrow applica-
tion of the Software Directive that applied the exhaustion rule only to pro-
grams on hard copies would allow rightholders to bypass the statutory protec-
tion by making programs downloadable from the Internet or by demanding 
further remuneration even though the first sale constituted adequate compen-
sation for the program.72 
The court held that Oracle exhausted its exclusive distribution rights 
when it made copies of its computer program available on the Internet and 
granted a license agreement in exchange for payment to its customers to have 
the right to use that copy for an unlimited period of time.73 Given that the 
transaction involved the transfer of a right of ownership of that particular copy 
by the owner of the copyright to the user, Oracle could not prohibit the resale 
of copies sold notwithstanding license agreement language to the contrary.74 
2. The Rental/License/Sale Distinction 
The CJEU also considered whether Oracle’s business model constituted 
a sale, rental, or license of the computer program.75 Article 4(2) refers to sales 
rather than licenses.76 Oracle argued that the key distinction is between a sale 
and a license.77 It claimed that it had not sold any copies but rather made 
them available for free and only charged a fee for the license that it required 
in order to use a downloaded copy.78Advocate General Bot disagreed with 
Oracle in the distinction between the sale and the license.79 He argued the 
relevant distinction was between a sale and a rental.80 
The CJEU took yet another approach.81 It held that the downloading of a 
copy of the software and the conclusion of a license agreement for that copy 
formed an indivisible whole because either of the two parts of the transaction 
                                                                                                                           
 70 See id. ¶¶ 42–59. 
 71 Id. ¶ 42. 
 72 See id. ¶¶ 49, 63. 
 73 See id. ¶ 89. 
 74 See id. 
 75 See UsedSoft, 2012 E.C.R. I-00000 ¶¶ 42–59; Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 41, 
¶¶ 46–60. 
 76 See Council Directive 2009/24, supra note 8, art. 4(2). 
 77 See UsedSoft, 2012 E.C.R. I-00000 ¶ 43; Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 41, 
¶ 54. 
 78 UsedSoft, 2012 E.C.R. I-00000 ¶ 43; Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 41, ¶ 54. 
 79 Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 41, ¶¶ 55–60. 
 80 See id. 
 81 See infra notes 82–86 and accompanying text. 
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would be pointless without the other.82 The court also held that the fact that 
the license was for an unlimited period did not allow the copyright owner to 
circumvent the exhaustion principle, warning that a contrary holding would 
undermine the effectiveness of the overall principle.83 
In sum, the CJEU held that subsequent acquirers of a used license, such 
as UsedSoft and its customers, were lawful acquirers of the computer pro-
gram copy and could download it from the copyright owner’s website without 
committing copyright infringement.84 The court formulated a three-pronged 
test in order to determine whether the subsequent download had the protec-
tion of the exhaustion principle.85 The copy must have been downloaded from 
the rightholder’s website; the rightholder must have provided a license to use 
that copy for an unlimited period of time; and the rightholder must have re-
ceived a fee that serves as remuneration corresponding to the economic value 
of the downloaded copy.86 
The court nevertheless carved out two caveats.87 First, it held that group 
licenses, those where the user obtains a single copy of the computer program 
along with a license to install it multiple times, could not be divided and parts 
of it resold.88 Second, the original acquirer of the copy of the computer pro-
gram could only benefit from the right to resell if he made the downloaded 
copy on his own computer unusable at the time of resale.89 Continuous use of 
the computer program by the original acquirer of the license after he resold it 
would infringe the copyright owner’s right of reproduction, which is not ex-
hausted by the first sale.90 
III. ANALYSIS 
The ruling in UsedSoft demonstrates the CJEU’s willingness to apply the 
free movement and exhaustion principles to computer programs. 91  While 
these principles are admittedly sound, their application to software licensing 
raises serious questions of efficiency and appropriateness.92 The court clumsi-
ly forced the decision using well-established principles and failed to adapt to 
an ever-changing technological landscape.93 The decision seems set to put 
                                                                                                                           
 82 See UsedSoft, 2012 E.C.R. I-00000 ¶¶ 47–49. 
 83 Id. ¶ 49. 
 84 See id. ¶ 89. 
 85 See id. ¶ 88. 
 86 See id. 
 87 See infra notes 88–90 and accompanying text. 
 88 UsedSoft, 2012 E.C.R. I-00000 ¶ 86. 
 89 See id. ¶ 78. 
 90 See id. 
 91 Batchelor & Keohane, supra note 6, at 545. 
 92 See id. 
 93 See id.; infra notes 94–119 and accompanying text. 
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into motion an overhaul of the way in which companies deliver software to 
consumers, both within and outside of the European Union.94 
A. Implications for the Software Industry 
The court’s ruling in UsedSoft will heavily impact the software industry, 
which will have to adapt to the court’s new interpretation of copyright law.95 
While some vendors may consider changes in their business model prema-
ture, given that the federal court in Germany has not ruled on the case since 
the CJEU rulings on the preliminary questions, others are likely to start con-
sidering structural changes to their business model.96 
There are a number of ways that the software industry may choose to al-
ter its delivery of products to circumvent the court’s ruling and remain in 
compliance with EU regulations.97 Some of the possible structures include 
permitting resale only under certain conditions; using a selective distribution 
system; charging a higher rate for personal licenses than transferable licenses; 
withholding support on transferred licenses or charging more for them; short-
ening the license duration; setting up a transfer validation registry; and 
switching to cloud computing.98 Other solutions include transitioning to a 
subscription-based model where the company does not deliver the software.99 
Council Directive 2001/29 states that the provision of services over the Inter-
net will not cause exhaustion, so if a court considers a subscription model to 
be a provision of services, the exhaustion principle is unlikely to apply.100 
Of course, these solutions are not without risks.101 For instance, analyses 
of security concerns related to cloud computing has been relatively shallow, 
given the youth of the model and the limited evidence of threats to it.102 Addi-
tionally, the question remains to be seen as to who will have to make these 
changes.103 Indeed, while the CJEU limited its ruling in UsedSoft to “com-
puter programs” and “software,” it was imprecise in defining the meaning of 
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those terms.104 The effect of the case on mobile games, cloud computing, 
freemium games, subscription models, and product keys is still unclear.105 
The court’s decision will also likely have implications on the choice of 
law provisions used in software licensing agreements.106 In UsedSoft, Oracle 
chose to file suit in the regional court in Munich, Germany.107 Software com-
panies may find it more desirable to litigate in other forums, while those in 
the second-hand market will find EU law more favorable.108 
Ultimately, the court’s decision will have the strongest impact on con-
sumers.109 The primary expected outcome of UsedSoft is that the costs of the 
court’s interpretation will be borne by the consumer through higher prices or 
reduced innovation.110 The software developer, who will now make a profit 
on the original sale only, may charge higher prices to make up for the gains 
no longer available through restricting further sales of the program.111 
B. Application of the Exhaustion Doctrine Beyond the European  
Software Industry 
The CJEU’s ruling in UsedSoft also raises serious questions on the effect 
on trade outside of the European Union.112 The court’s ruling and interpreta-
tion of Article 4(2) indicates that the exhaustion principle applies if the soft-
ware was first licensed inside the European Union.113 As a result, American 
software companies that have licensed software in the EU for an indefinite 
term can no longer oppose the resale of copies by EU licensees, even if the 
terms of the license expressly prohibit such sales.114 This does not, however, 
answer the question on what law applies when someone subsequently sells 
software outside of the European Union.115 
Indeed, it is unclear whether American software companies can prevent 
the resale of software programs in the United States by European licensees.116 
United States exhaustion law is likely to determine the permissibility of re-
importation and resale of software that found its way to the European Un-
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ion.117 American copyright law is split on applying the first-sale doctrine to 
licenses.118 Therefore, even if an American court were to find that the first 
sale by a rightholder in the European Union exhausted American copyright, 
an importer would still have to convince the court that the CJEU holding 
should be applied to imported software that was licensed rather than sold.119 
CONCLUSION 
UsedSoft v. Oracle has highlighted the challenges involved in upholding 
the application of the principles of free movement and exhaustion in the digi-
tal sphere, and the questionable effectiveness of courts that may constantly be 
one step behind software developers. While the CJEU’s ruling came as a sur-
prise to many in how far it was willing to go in applying the principle of ex-
haustion to intangible materials, its attempt fell short from elucidating a clear 
rule on the rights of second-hand buyers. The wide array of ways in which 
software programs can reach the end consumer means that copyright protec-
tion against software resellers based on technical solutions may ultimately 
provide a way out of the CJEU’s ruling. Similarly, the CJEU’s ruling explicit-
ly excludes the subscription model, and therefore this business model may 
become appealing to software vendors in the future. 
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